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NUCLEAR WORLD ORDER AND NONPROLIFERATION
UCRL-JRNL-227856
Neil Joeck1
The decision by India and Pakistan in May 1998 to conduct nuclear weapon 
tests and declare themselves as nuclear weapon states challenged South Asian 
regional stability calculations, US nonproliferation policy, and prevailing assumptions 
about international security.  A decade later, the effects of those tests are still being 
felt and policies are still adjusting to the changed global conditions.  This paper will 
consider non- and counter proliferation policy options for the United States and 
Pakistan as they work as partners to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology and 
further nuclear proliferation. 
Nonproliferation and counter proliferation in South Asia
For several decades, one of the lynchpins of US nonproliferation policy was an 
effort to prevent India and Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons.  India and 
Pakistan consistently resisted most of the bilateral and multilateral policies adopted 
by the US to achieve that outcome. India, because of its concerns about the threat 
from a nuclear-armed China and its resistance to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT), refused to forgo nuclear weapons and conducted a nuclear test in 1974. 2  
The US took numerous steps to prevent Pakistan from following the same path, but 
with limited success.  The measures included denying legal access to nuclear 
technology, whether from the US or from other nuclear capable states; denying 
Pakistan access to military equipment, even in the case of F-16 aircraft for which 
Pakistan had already paid; sanctioning entities within Pakistan as well as the country 
as a whole; and pressuring Pakistan to join a variety of international regimes whose 
effect would have been to thwart Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons.  Having been 
  
1 Senior Research Fellow, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory.  The opinions expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory or the US Government.
2 The best sources on India’s nuclear program are George Perkovich India’s Nuclear Bomb: The 
Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California, 1999) and Ashley Tellis India’s
Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2001).
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violently divided in the 1971 civil war that created Bangladesh out of East Pakistan, 
Pakistan feared that India would support additional secessionist elements in the 
future.  Pakistan’s security planners feared that India would one day again be 
tempted to take advantage of Pakistan’s internal divisions, but believed that nuclear 
weapons would prevent that from happening.  The quest for the requisite technology 
defined Pakistan’s security policy for the two decades following its December 1971 
surrender to India. 3
As it became increasingly clear during the 1990s that diplomatic efforts were 
not sufficient to prevent certain states from acquiring nuclear capabilities, the US 
mounted a more aggressive counter proliferation effort.4 The immediate targets of 
US counter proliferation policy were states whose foreign policies were considered 
hostile, such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Syria.  Although the US focused 
on what it termed “rogue” states, others feared that they were also in the line of fire.  
India and Pakistan were both concerned that US efforts to counter proliferation might 
be directed against their own programs.  With the US at the same time pursuing a 
comprehensive test ban treaty and the permanent extension of the NPT, India saw a 
window of legitimacy closing on its nuclear options and conducted a series of five 
nuclear weapon tests in 1998. Pakistan’s decision to respond to India’s nuclear tests 
was difficult.  The US pressured Islamabad not to test and offered extensive 
economic and military aid to desist.  Following India’s tests, however, the Indian 
Home Minister, L. K. Advani, warned Pakistan “to roll back its anti-India policy, 
especially with regards to Kashmir”.5 Meanwhile, Pakistani opposition politicians 
asserted that not conducting its own nuclear test would compromise Pakistan’s 
  
3 There is nothing comparable to the Perkovich and Tellis books for Pakistan.  A useful early 
study is Ashok Kapur Pakistan’s Nuclear Development (New York: Croom Helm, 1987); Shahid-
ur-Rehman’s Long Road to Chagai (Islamabad: Print Wise, 1999) is flawed but filled with 
interesting details; and Gordon Corera’s Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global 
Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A. Q. Khan Network (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006) covers the Khan network very well.
4 Early expositions of the approach were Harald Mueller and Mitchell Reiss,  
“Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine in Old Bottles,” The Washington Quarterly 18 (Spring 
1995), pp. 143-154 and Brad Roberts, “From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation,” International 
Security 18 (Summer 1993), pp. 139-173.
5 Federation of American Scientists, WMD Around the World, available at 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/nuke/chron.htm
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national integrity and dignity.6 From a scientific perspective, a nuclear response to 
India’s provocation would also allow Pakistan’s scientists to test principles and design 
parameters that would improve the weapon stockpile.  For all these reasons, it was 
virtually a certainty that Pakistan would follow India’s lead; Pakistan demonstrated its 
own nuclear capability with a series of tests on May 28 and 30.  The reciprocal test 
series thus ended years of US efforts to prevent the nuclearization of the 
subcontinent.  
The nuclear tests forced the US to impose certain nonproliferation sanctions.  
The US Congress had passed the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act in 1994 that 
required the imposition of sanctions on any state that conducted a nuclear test.7 The 
law was yet another legal effort to hamstring India.  It may have worked in 1995, 
when the economic consequences of conducting a test apparently convinced India’s 
leadership under P. V. Narasimha Rao to forgo a planned nuclear test.8 It did not 
work in 1998 when the more assertive BJP—supported by the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh’s argument that economic autarky was possible and desirable 
for India and therefore economic sanctions would be irrelevant—authorized the test 
series.9 The US almost immediately saw the defect in its own policy, when American 
wheat farmers pointed out to the Administration that the economic cost was more 
burdensome to the US than to India.10 Some of the sanctions consequently were 
immediately lifted, and it was only a matter of time—until July 2001—before the rest 
of the sanctions came off.  
Confidence in the global nonproliferation regime was shaken by India’s and 
Pakistan’s tests, but its basic structures remained intact and India and Pakistan 
continued to remain outside the nonproliferation mainstream.  They were nuclear 
  
6 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s manhood was challenged by opposition leader Benazir Bhutto 
who dramatically “ripped off her bangles … a symbol of femininity, and cast them toward the 
crowd in a gesture that said: "Give these to Sharif, he does not have the guts to stand up to 
India."  John Kifner, New York Times news service cited in Frontline, Vol. 15, No. 12, June 06-19, 
1998.
7 Available at http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/NonProliferationAct.shtml
8 See Neil Joeck, “Nuclear Developments in India and Pakistan,” Access Asia Review, National 
Bureau of Asian Research, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1999, p. 4.  
9 See Walter Andersen The Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and 
Hindu Revivalism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987).
10 Eric Schmitt, “Senate Votes to Lift Most Remaining India-Pakistan Penalties”, New York Times, 
July 16, 1998, Section A, Page 10.
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capable, but they were not legal nuclear weapon states.  Though their tests 
challenged the goals of the NPT, their status as non-NPT nuclear weapon states 
created new obstacles to expanding their diplomatic relations with a variety of states.  
Although the Clinton Administration tried to overcome the barrier at least with India, it 
was not prepared to change US nonproliferation and therefore continued the policy of 
nuclear isolation toward both new nuclear states.11  
The tests did not end US concerns about nuclear proliferation in other parts of 
the world, while they increased concerns about possible nuclear use.  From 
Washington’s perspective, the addition of more nuclear weapon states to the so-
called club created a range of problems.  With more fingers on the trigger, there was 
a greater chance that nuclear weapons would be used.  If nuclear weapons were 
used in a war, the resulting carnage could have enormous humanitarian implications.  
More narrowly, it would also make continued US reliance on nuclear weapons for 
security more problematic.  Those in favor of nuclear disarmament would be armed 
with a fresh example of the terrible consequences of nuclear use.  Though not 
insuperable, such opposition to nuclear weapons would complicate American 
defense planning.  In addition, nuclear use could produce widespread nuclear fallout 
with negative environmental consequences.  On a separate note, nuclear weapons 
might be used with militarily advantageous results by a smaller power.  Even if limited 
nuclear use produced relatively inconsequential humanitarian and environmental 
consequences, nuclear weapons might turn the tide of battle.  Such a result would 
make it very difficult to prevent still more proliferation which, from Washington’s 
perspective, would make the world less secure.  Finally, with more fissile material 
and nuclear weapons spread around, the risk would increase that a terrorist or other 
nonstate actor would be able to seize or assemble a device to blackmail or actually 
use against the US or others.12 Regarding India and Pakistan, US nonproliferation 
policy continued to be anchored in the NPT, which prevented the US from helping 
  
11 Strobe Talbott Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb (Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2004).
12 US concerns about the consequences of nuclear spread go back over decades to such books 
as Richard Rosecrance, Ed.  The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1964), George Quester ed. Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain (Madison, 
WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), and Henry Sokolski, Ed.  Fighting Proliferation: New 
Concerns for the Nineties (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1996).
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any state to develop or manage nuclear weapons, regardless of its standing in the 
treaty.  Thus, future interactions with India and Pakistan would have to accommodate 
the fact that both states had nuclear weapons, without at the same time 
compromising the US’ legal commitments under the NPT. 
When the Bush Administration assumed office in January of 2001, the test-
related sanctions were lifted with the expectation that India and Pakistan would 
constrain onward proliferation.  Although prevention had in the end failed, it seemed 
reasonable to expect that both new nuclear states would jealously protect their 
nuclear capabilities at home and adopt policies to prevent the spread of their nuclear 
technology abroad.  Thus, avoiding onward proliferation—ensuring that Indian and 
Pakistani nuclear technology not be transferred to third states—became the defining 
element in proliferation policy toward the two states.  
From counter proliferation to nuclear cooperation
At the same time, the Bush Administration decided on a policy of de-
hyphenating its broader relations with the two South Asian nuclear powers.  India and 
Pakistan had often been treated almost as conjoined twins—separated at birth in 
1947 when British colonial rule came to an end, but still viewed as a linked problem 
set in the minds of Washington’s policy makers.  Under the new policy of conducting 
diplomatic relations with each country on its own terms, Washington developed an 
approach to Pakistan—heavily focused on counter-terrorism—that was designed not
to impinge on India.  In the same vein, the US developed a new relationship with 
India that envisioned cooperation in economics and trade, defense, development, 
and energy—but not at Pakistan’s expense.  Achieving such a fine balance in South 
Asia had been a historic challenge to successive US administrations, and continues 
to require thoughtful diplomatic negotiations with both countries.  Cooperation on 
energy, in particular nuclear energy, was particularly sensitive due to US 
commitments under the NPT, the legal restriction created by the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Act of 1978, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group policy of restricting 
nuclear commerce with any state lacking full scope safeguards on its nuclear 
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facilities.13 So long as India was prepared to take a number of steps to ensure that it 
was not allowing onward proliferation of its technology, however, it was possible for 
the Bush Administration to imagine a change in US law and NSG policy to facilitate 
establishing a new relationship despite India’s nuclear status.  The new approach to 
India therefore evolved from a focus on the so-called trinity issues (civil nuclear, 
space, and high-technology cooperation) in 2002-2003 into the Next Steps in the 
Strategic Partnership in 2003-2004, culminating in the agreement reached by 
President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in July 2005.14 A cornerstone 
of the new relationship was the civil nuclear component, which continues to be 
subject to negotiation between the two sides.
As the new relationship with India was evolving, new measures were taken 
with Pakistan to expand beyond counter terrorism.  Pakistan was designated a major 
non-NATO ally, defense supply constraints were lifted, substantial debt burdens were 
forgiven and renegotiated, and a new aid program was initiated.  In the middle of this 
fairly substantial expansion of bilateral ties, however, the activities of Dr. A. Q. Khan 
came to light.15 In 2003 and early 2004, it became evident that A. Q. Khan had 
conducted a massive world wide nuclear technology transfer operation.  Not only was 
Khan pocketing upwards of $100 million, he was doing so by selling Pakistan’s most 
sensitive nuclear technology to three states of greatest concern to US foreign 
policy—North Korea, Iran, and Libya.  In its eagerness to develop a nuclear deterrent 
following the 1971 Bangladesh debacle, Pakistan had evidently failed to exercise 
sufficient oversight to ensure that its clandestinely acquired goods remained under 
tight central control.  The stain of Khan’s action spread to many parts of the Pakistan 
government.  With onward proliferation a key test of responsible stewardship of 
nuclear technology, Pakistan appeared to have failed.
  
13 “Press Statement of Nuclear Suppliers Meeting: Meeting of States Adhering to the Nuclear 
Suppliers Guidelines”, Warsaw, Poland, April 3, 1992.  Available at 
http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/PRESS/1992-Press.pdf
14 Ashley Tellis, India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States, 
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), pp. 1-51.
15 Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs.
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According to President Musharraf’s own account of the A. Q. Khan episode, 
the Pakistan government observed suspicious activity as early as 1999.16 In his 
telling, the establishment of a nuclear command structure in February 2000 opened 
up new windows to Khan’s activities, but not enough to make a case against him.  To 
clip his wings, Musharraf required in 2001 that he resign as Director of the 
eponymous Khan Research Laboratories.  Recognizing Qadir’s stature in the popular 
Pakistani imagination as the father of the nuclear bomb and to avoid any appearance 
that he was being persecuted, Musharraf also asked Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad to resign at 
the same time as Director of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission.  Though out 
of office, Khan was not out of business, and it was only two years later that the extent 
of Qadir’s enterprise came clear.  At President Bush’s request, Musharraf received a 
briefing in September 2003 from US CIA Director George Tenet that detailed A. Q. 
Khan’s network.  Though Pakistan itself had tried without success to figure out what 
Khan was doing, US intelligence information revealed for Musharraf the full story.  As 
Musharraf commented, “The whole ugly episode … blew straight into Pakistan’s 
face.”17 At this point Pakistan’s investigators apparently grew more aggressive, as in 
early November 2003 revelations about his activities began to flow.  Pakistan was 
acutely embarrassed, but nonetheless took responsibility for mismanaging its own 
sensitive nuclear technology.
Despite this failure, Bush and Musharraf addressed broader issues in the 
bilateral US-Pakistan relationship when they met and signed the US-Pakistan joint 
statement of March 4, 2006, putting the relations on a new cooperative track.18
Chastened by the A. Q. Khan affair, the Pakistanis are now understandably more 
cautious about the spread of nuclear technology around the world. Indeed, Pakistan 
is acutely aware that the possibility that terrorists might acquire a nuclear weapon or 
fissile material poses as much of a threat to itself as to any other country.  If a 
terrorist seized a Pakistani weapon, it is quite likely that it would stay inside Pakistan 
and be used to blackmail the Pakistan government.  Pakistan’s porous border with 
  
16 Pervez Musharraf  In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Free Press, 2006), Chap. 27.
17 Ibid, p. 293.
18 Joint Statement on United States-Pakistan Strategic Partnership, March 4, 2006 available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060304-1.html 
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Afghanistan also creates a possibility for a terrorist to move sensitive nuclear material 
outside of Pakistan.  The broader problem of unsettled borders and an international 
black market for nuclear material worries nuclear plant managers throughout Central 
Asia and Europe as well as in Pakistan.  The US and Pakistan therefore have a 
common interest in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
technology, and in ensuring that all forms of sensitive nuclear material stay safe and 
secure in storage facilities inside Pakistan.  The Bush-Musharraf joint statement 
noted that the new relationship was based on shared interests in “promoting peace 
and security, stability, prosperity, and democracy in South Asia and across the 
globe”.19 Combined efforts to prevent proliferation and secure nuclear material will 
make a major contribution to that shared vision. 
Having achieved a nuclear weapons capability, Pakistan is now in the same 
position as other nuclear weapon states in that it must responsibly safeguard its own 
stockpile and ensure that it is not again a source for onward proliferation.  Where 
some states in the past have argued that it is the right of all sovereign nations to 
possess nuclear weapons if they wish, it is clear to the global community that this is 
not the case.  Every state with a nuclear technology capability has an unusual 
responsibility to guarantee that its own hard-won capability stays safe and secure.  It 
is therefore appropriate that the US and Pakistan together consider what measures 
can be adopted to prevent nuclear technology transfer without compromising 
Pakistan’s legitimate defense requirements.  It should be clear to Pakistan, as was 
evident in the negotiations between India and the US, that cooperation to prevent 
further proliferation does not amount to an endorsement of the decisions Pakistan 
made about nuclear weapons.  The US is still governed by its own prior policy 
decisions to prevent proliferation. 
Just as the United States was able to construct a post-nuclear test relationship 
with India, it is imperative that Washington do the same with Pakistan.  As noted, the 
US-Pakistan defense relationship is already expanding.  Pakistan’s social and 
political issues are also an important part of the policy convergence, especially 
regarding the threat from terrorism, but also in terms of education, social welfare, 
  
19 Ibid.
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human rights and democratic reform.  It is an enormous challenge now for both 
states to find common ground and a shared approach to nuclear proliferation.  This 
issue has cast a shadow over US-Pakistan relations for over thirty years.  The fact 
that Pakistan and the US disagreed on this issue in the past, however, does not 
mean that the two states must continue to disagree.  The US cannot facilitate 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, but a range of concerns will bring them 
together as they seek to increase regional stability and prevent nuclear spread.  In 
many cases, it may be necessary to work out new rules of the road.  This may have 
to be case specific as Pakistan tries to solidify its nuclear deterrent while the US 
follows its legal and policy obligations.
Prospects for civil nuclear cooperation
Before considering where the US and Pakistan can cooperate in preventing 
further proliferation, it must be noted that there will be roadblocks in the area of 
civilian nuclear technology.  From Pakistan’s perspective this seems unfair, as the 
US decision to amend its laws to allow civilian nuclear cooperation with India looks 
like one more example of a double standard that impedes Pakistan’s development 
while helping India’s.  The structure of international export controls that was swiftly 
established after India’s nuclear test in 1974 had a more harmful effect on Pakistan, 
yet it came in response to actions taken in India.  The NSG states in its brief history 
that it was “created following the explosion in 1974 of a nuclear device by a non-
nuclear weapon State.”20 The only non-nuclear weapon state to test in 1974 was 
India, but the NSG’s policies affected Pakistan and forced its procurement network 
underground.  As Pakistanis see it, they paid the price for India’s nuclear test.  Now 
they see Pakistan paying a price for a series of tests initiated by India.  Despite that 
series of tests, India now enjoys a cooperative relationship with the US on nuclear 
issues, while Pakistan is relegated to the sidelines.  
As noted earlier, however, the U.S.-India agreement is unfinished and it may 
be premature to draw conclusions about double standards.  The US and India still 
need to complete their negotiations on a 123 nuclear cooperation agreement, and 
  
20 Available at http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/history.htm
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India will then need to negotiate a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.  At that
point, the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group will in turn have to evaluate the merits of the 
proposed change to NSG policy.  Thus, it is too soon to draw any conclusions or to 
generalize about the effect of the change in law and proposed change in policy.  In 
Pakistan’s view, though, the spirit of the change is as important as the law itself.  If a 
new principle has been established, why should Pakistan not also be a beneficiary?  
Furthermore, the opening proposed by the US, regardless of its current diplomatic 
status, has opened the door for other states to engage in nuclear cooperation with 
India.  Indeed, from Pakistan’s perspective, the agreement will allow India to expand 
its military nuclear capability in ways that will profoundly affect Pakistan’s defense 
calculations.21 Why should India be allowed this exception, but not Pakistan?  The 
simple answer is that the effects of the revelations about the A. Q. Khan network still 
linger.  It required many scientists to contribute to Pakistan’s nuclear defense, but it
only took one to sully the nation’s reputation for probity.  It will take time to change 
the perception Khan created of a program out of control. 
Pakistanis from President Musharraf on down argue that the network was the 
act of one man and that Pakistan has changed its laws and internal oversight to 
prevent a repetition of Khan’s activities.  These long-overdue measures, which are 
very positive, do not resolve the issue entirely.  A number of questions have not been 
answered, for example regarding the activities of individuals who previously worked 
with Khan and may now be operating their own networks abroad.  The book 
Timbuktu: City in the Middle of Nowhere,22 which details Khan’s travels through 
Africa, offers only one example of the range of participants involved in what appeared 
to be as much a shopping trip as a tourist’s itinerary.  In the book, the author recounts 
what appears to be a simple vacation.  Yet some of the key participants in Khan’s 
illegal activities are members of the group, which frequently is treated more as an 
official delegation than a tourist group.  In particular, Henk Slebos, B. S. A. Tahir and 
  
21 Though Pakistanis may not be convinced by his logic or his numbers, Ashley Tellis has argued 
that the new agreement will not expand India’s nuclear arsenal since, even without the new 
agreement, “New Delhi is in fact producing far less weapons-grade plutonium than it is capable 
of, given its current capacity.”  Atoms for War? U.S.—Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and 
India’s Nuclear Arsenal (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), p. 15.
22 Abdul Mabood Siddiqui, Timbuktu: City in the Middle of Nowhere (Islamabad: Hurmat 
Publications (Pvt) Ltd., 2001).
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Nazeer Ahmed are all part of the delegation that visits such unusual tourist sites as a 
display on the processing of yellowcake in the Niamey Museum in Niger.  These 
activities occurred before Pakistan fully investigated Khan, and no doubt contributed 
to official suspicions about his far-flung travels.  The book begs the question, 
however, as to what they and the other travelers are doing now.  Some were 
apprehended at the same time as Khan, but it remains unclear who else they may 
have contacted, what clandestine companies may have been established, and what 
blueprints and/or photocopies may be available in black market circles.  Slebos and 
Tahir are not Pakistani nationals, but other members of the group in addition to 
Nazeer are, and they raise additional questions about Pakistan’s internal 
investigations into Khan’s activities at home and abroad.  Who else was involved and 
remains free to carry on the network’s activities?  What technology remains on the 
market?  Are Pakistan’s continuing efforts to acquire technology opening up new 
opportunities for black market exchanges?  Are potential Al Qaida or other terrorists 
infiltrating the supply chains?  Pakistan does not have all the answers; other 
countries were penetrated.  But the malfeasance of a single Pakistani ringleader 
selling Pakistan’s technology, as Musharraf put it, blows right into Pakistan’s face.  It 
may not be fair, but as progress is achieved in answering these and other questions, 
the effects of Khan’s actions will diminish.  Despite powerful international opposition 
and the concentrated efforts of the US and other governments to prevent it, Pakistan 
acquired this high-value technology to ensure the defense of the nation.  The ability 
of a single individual, even though highly placed, to compromise Pakistan’s security 
has cast doubt on the nation’s ability to maintain internal control over nuclear 
technology.  It will be difficult to convince states around the world to share nuclear 
technology, given this tarnished record.
It is fair to ask, however, how long Pakistan will have to remain in the docket 
and what steps it must take to redeem itself.  It is notable that Pakistan has passed 
laws since the Khan affair was exposed in an effort to ensure that the technology is 
not transferred again.  But Khan broke laws already on the books in Pakistan when 
he transferred the technology in the first place.  It is not just a matter of new laws, 
therefore, but how they are implemented that will be an important bell weather of 
12
12
change.  Pakistan has made it clear that it has conducted its own internal 
investigation and does not require outside assistance.  Yet this approach has a look 
of circling the wagons on the Khan affair rather than being transparent about his 
reckless conduct.  Khan himself has confessed to transferring technology and 
President Musharraf has acknowledged that Khan transferred actual centrifuges.23  
Despite this, Musharraf felt compelled to grant Khan a pardon for his transgressions 
because, “the public would be sure to protest any prosecution, no matter what the 
facts were.”24 In this comment Musharraf is acknowledging the difficult task he faces 
in balancing national security requirements with domestic politics and upholding the 
law.  Pakistan is ruled by law but must recognize Khan’s self-made status as the 
father of Pakistan’s bomb and his popular support.  He deserves credit for playing an 
important role, but Pakistan’s bomb took a village to raise it.  Thus Musharraf had to 
assert executive authority in his response to the crime in recognition of the demands 
of national security and public opinion.  As the balance tips toward harsh punishment 
for those violating Pakistan’s laws against technology transfer, the perception of 
Pakistan as an irresponsible guardian of nuclear technology will inevitably soften.
Pakistan is clearly in a difficult position, since the actions of one prominent 
official has brought the entire country into disrepute.  His efforts for the country have 
made him a hero in the popular imagination, well out of proportion to the contribution 
he made.  The patient, quiet, and professional efforts of scientists such as Munir 
Ahmed Khan, Ishfaq Ahmed, and Samar Mubarakmand, were every bit as 
substantial, yet have not been played up in the popular press.25 While their efforts 
were kept out of the spotlight, A. Q. Khan was busy lining his own pockets and 
embarrassing the country.  The problem continues, given the country’s continuing 
need for nuclear technology and weapons.  Pakistan must continue to keep its 
nuclear cards close to its vest, as it fears outside intervention.  Yet the very process 
of keeping its nuclear capabilities and intentions opaque makes outsiders suspicious 
  
23 “Pakistan confirms nuclear link to North Korea”, International Herald Tribune, August 25, 2005, 
p. 1
24 Musharraf, p. 294.
25 This oversight is beginning to be corrected.  See Usman Shabbir, “Remembering Unsung 
Heroes: Munir Ahmed Khan”, Defence Journal, Vol. 7, No. 10, May 2004 and M. A. Chaudhri, 
“Pakistan’s Nuclear History: Separating Myth from Reality”, Defence Journal, Vol. 9, No. 10, May 
2006.
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about what is going on inside the country.  This conundrum will resurface in other 
areas of potential cooperation, but at least one consequence will be that Pakistan’s 
desire to exploit civilian nuclear technology may be frustrated in the near term.  Civil 
nuclear power is symbolically linked to proliferation, and Pakistan continues to be 
tarnished by Khan’s irresponsible behavior.  Nuclear weapons and nuclear energy 
have quite different policy implications, and one might argue that Khan’s actions 
regarding nuclear weapons should not prevent Pakistan from exploiting civilian 
nuclear technology.  But they are nonetheless linked symbolically, and perceptions 
matter.  Failure to act responsibly in one area inevitably undercuts arguments for 
cooperation in the other. 
Some Pakistani analysts also argue that India is getting a free ride, since it too 
has violated export control laws.  India has repeatedly claimed that it has not 
transferred nuclear technology, yet two Indian scientists were sanctioned by the 
United States in 2005 for providing assistance to Iran’s nuclear program.26  
Moreover, an Indian firm, Cirrus, Inc. was indicted for “working as an agent of the 
Indian government to obtain sensitive missile and weapons technology for its military 
programs.”27 These examples challenge India’s claims but they do not compare in 
magnitude to the Khan network.  Khan tried to sell an entire centrifuge capability and 
a nuclear weapon design to Libya.  When he switched from being an importer to an 
exporter, he also switched from being a patriot to a mercenary, offering up Pakistan’s 
most valued secrets for a hefty sum of money.  Drawing a comparison between the 
cases tends to underscore Pakistani inattentiveness rather than condemn Indian 
malfeasance.   
It would be unfortunate if Pakistan’s frustration with what looks like a double 
standard resulted in a contrary approach to countering proliferation and working with 
the international community to ensure that dangerous actors do not acquire nuclear 
technology.  Pakistan lives in a difficult neighborhood and has a clear interest in 
making sure that nuclear technology remains in responsible hands. Thus, though the 
  
26 For more, see C. Christine Fair, “Indo-Iranian Ties: Thicker Than Oil”, The Middle East Review 
of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1, March 2007.  Sanctions on one were later reversed.
27 Mark Mazzetti and Neil Lewis, “U.S. Cites Indian Government Agencies in Weapons 
Conspiracy”, New York Times, April 3, 2007.
14
14
expansion of civilian nuclear power in Pakistan will be somewhat complicated for the 
near term, counter proliferation policy can expand significantly through Pakistan’s 
unilateral, multilateral, and bilateral efforts.  Indeed, the more vigorously that Pakistan 
supports international efforts, the more likely it will be seen as a good candidate for 
extended nuclear cooperation. 
Unilateral actions
One of the measures pressed on Pakistan for several years involves 
suspending production of fissile material for weapons.  Yet cutting off the production 
of fissile material for weapons may undercut Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent.  As Peter 
Lavoy has argued,
… the emergence of new political and military challenges arising from 
the U.S.-India strategic partnership—particularly the U.S.-India initiative 
for civilian nuclear cooperation and possible defense technology and 
military equipment transfers—will further test the ability of Pakistan’s 
military leadership to maintain a robust, credible, and secure nuclear 
deterrent.28
Lavoy notes that Pakistan’s nuclear planners do not intend to engage in an arms 
race with India, by which they mean that they will confine themselves to a limited 
quantity of weapons and therefore of fissile material.  This approach is also 
consistent with Pakistan’s stated plans to construct a minimum deterrent capability.  
The possibility that India may acquire even a limited missile defense capability from 
the US or elsewhere, however, complicates Pakistani planning about what quantity of 
weapons it will need.  Pakistan is also convinced that India enjoys a sizable lead in its 
stockpile of fissile material, which, as noted earlier, will be enhanced by the new 
agreement with the US.  Thus as a hedge it would make sense, as Pakistani strategic 
planners see it, to avoid a unilateral commitment that may compromise Pakistan’s 
deterrence requirements.  
Recent developments suggest that Pakistan may be thinking about a larger 
stockpile and is already in an arms race with India.  The Institute for Science and 
International Security (ISIS), an American nongovernmental organization, continues 
  
28 “Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture: Security and Survivability”, Nonproliferation Policy Education 
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to monitor the construction of what appears to be a new plutonium production reactor 
and reprocessing facility at Chashma.29 Completion of these facilities will provide 
Pakistan an expanded stockpile of plutonium, which will significantly add to 
Pakistan’s weapon stockpile.  This suggests that Pakistan’s defense planners have 
concluded that the country needs substantial additional quantities of plutonium for 
weapons.  If this does not contradict Pakistan’s assertions that it will confine itself to a 
minimum stockpile, it at least raises the question of what “minimum” means. 
An alternate explanation for Pakistan’s plan to expand its fissile material 
production capacity may be its own version of the technological imperative.  Because 
less plutonium is need to fabricate a weapon than highly enriched uranium, 
expanding the production of plutonium may offer advantages to Pakistan’s scientists.  
The establishment in 2000 of the Strategic Plans Division under the National 
Command Authority created a mechanism for ensuring that force structure was 
dictated by military requirements.  The integration of science and strategy was thus 
ensured, but both are dynamic.  New scientific advances can influence strategy, and 
a changed strategic environment can call for technological change.  As scientists 
develop new concepts, it may make sense for military planners to be more 
responsive to potential technical advances.  Thus the expansion of Pakistan’s 
plutonium stockpile may serve scientific preferences, but may also put certain stress 
on military planning, potentially creating a contradiction between what scientists 
would like and what the country needs.  Determining the right quantity and the right 
quality of the force structure—not just how many weapons, but also what type of 
weapons—to ensure deterrence requires a balance between strategy and science.  
An expanded stockpile of fissile material, whether plutonium or HEU, may address 
scientific opportunities, but only Pakistan’s defense planners can assess what 
balance is needed to provide minimum deterrence.  
Given these security demands, it is unlikely that Pakistan would unilaterally 
suspend its production of fissile material for weapons.  If, however, Pakistan were to 
limit fissile material production, it would reduce the demands for monitoring and 
  
29 David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Chashma Nuclear Site in Pakistan with Possible 
Reprocessing Plant”, Institute for Science and International Security, January 18, 2007
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/index.html
16
16
accounting that necessarily accompany larger stockpiles.  It is not the case that if you 
produce less fissile material, you are thereby a more responsible nuclear power.  But 
with more fissile material, there are greater demands for site security, transportation 
security, and reliable protective forces.  Additional fissile material may be stored in 
additional storage sites, which increases the number of vulnerabilities.  Additional 
material can also be stored in existing storage sites, but that would increase the 
value of those sites for targeting.  Limiting further production would help to keep the 
accounting and monitoring more manageable.  These issues will have to be 
addressed as Pakistan expands its fissile material supplies.
Multilateral actions
In trying to fortify the global nonproliferation regime, a number of activities and 
laws have been developed over the past several years.  They provide Pakistan an 
opportunity to cooperate in multilateral fora to prevent the transfer of nuclear 
technology worldwide.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is aimed at stopping shipments of 
“weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials 
worldwide.”30 Pakistan has not endorsed the principles of PSI yet, but has attended 
an exercise as an observer.  As they are written, these objectives may pose 
problems for Pakistan.  Islamabad is not inclined to oppose them per se, but they are 
the same objectives that were pursued for years in US efforts to stop Pakistan from 
acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place.  Endorsing a policy that was used 
against it will require a large psychological shift in Islamabad.  “Related materials” is 
a sufficiently broad term that Pakistan may fear its current efforts to acquire 
equipment to meet new technical challenges from India may put it at loggerheads 
with the Proliferation Security Initiative, as PSI does not contain exceptions for de 
facto or de jure nuclear weapon states.  
The breakup of the Khan smuggling ring is usually cited as the best example 
of a PSI success, and except for the embarrassment the disclosure caused, Pakistan 
benefited from having the ring broken up.  Yet this does not take away from the 
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possibility that Pakistan may itself be a target of PSI.  If PSI is nothing more than a 
multilateral effort to stop Pakistan’s nuclear program, Islamabad is unlikely to join the 
activity.  Such fears, however, could drive Pakistan into a policy cul de sac.  If 
Pakistan feels that it cannot join an organization whose goal is to prevent the activity 
that Pakistan itself decries—the illegal shipment of nuclear technology—this will 
inevitably cast doubt on Pakistan’s bona fides regarding stopping illicit nuclear 
transfer.  The result will be that it will be difficult to defend civil nuclear cooperation.  
Pakistan does not favor the illegal transfer of nuclear technology and has taken steps 
to shore up its laws that allowed the Khan network to operate.  But Pakistan’s 
continued desire to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent against India may require it 
to obtain materials “related” to WMD and their delivery means.  This is a security 
imperative for Islamabad that will trump international concerns.  Therefore Pakistan 
may find itself unable to join PSI even though it may agree with its principles.  This 
would again complicate Pakistan foreign policy decision-making.  Pakistan has 
already taken steps domestically to ensure that its own technology does not again 
get out of the country.  Yet if it still needs to acquire technology abroad, it will be 
hard-pressed to join an activity intended to prevent that very outcome, even though 
PSI may be the best place to start on a multilateral basis, what Pakistan has already 
done domestically.
A second area for Pakistani engagement in nonproliferation is United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1540, which calls for UN member states to prevent non-
state actors from acquiring WMD materials, establish laws prohibiting transfers to 
non-state actors, and develop domestic measures to ensure proper accounting, 
physical control, border control, and transfer of WMD technology.31 In its annual 
reports to the UNSCR 1540 Security Council Committee, Pakistan extensively 
reports on the array of laws and policies it has adopted to demonstrate compliance 
with UNSCR 1540.  Pakistan asserts that it is fully compliant with the law, and it is 
noteworthy that Pakistan has volunteered, as appropriate, “to provide assistance… to 
the states lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience 
  
31 Available at http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/
18
18
and/or resources for fulfilling the provisions” of UNSCR 1540.32 It is clear, however, 
that many of the laws Pakistan cites in its note verbale to the UN 1540 committee 
pre-date the activities of the Khan network.  Thus although Pakistan’s actions are 
impressive and set high standards, implementation of the norms contains some gaps.  
This is not unusual, as criminals, smugglers, and terrorists continue to exploit gaps 
where they can be found.  It does suggest, though, that there is room for cooperation, 
perhaps with respect to training, technology assistance, and the sharing of best 
practices in order to improve current standards and ensure against future leakage.
A third area for possible cooperation was made evident in the Bratislava 
summit in February 2005 between Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin.  That 
summit highlighted the continuing concern of those two states for the security of 
nuclear facilities.  With well over 100 years of experience between them in securing 
nuclear materials, it may be surprising that this issue continues to be a central 
concern at such a high level.  It captures, however, how critical this issue continues 
to be and how the major nuclear powers continue to struggle to get it right.  It is 
therefore an object lesson for the newer nuclear states.  Nuclear security is the 
dominant responsibility a state assumes when it develops nuclear weapons.  It is 
therefore essential that guard forces are adequately trained to deal with 
emergencies, psychologically screened to eliminate deviant personalities, and loyal 
to Pakistan to prevent infiltration by terrorist agents.  The forces need to receive 
adequate pay to eliminate any temptation to sell access to nuclear material; they 
need up-to-date equipment and arms so that they can overwhelm hostile forces; and 
they need sufficient education to understand the handling of sensitive nuclear 
material.  The US and Pakistan can cooperate in many of these areas, as needed.  
As President Musharraf said in his autobiography, “Every American official from the 
president down who spoke to me or visited Pakistan raised the issue of the safety of 
our nuclear arsenal.”33 There is clearly no need to belabor this point, only to cite it as 
a priority on the list of areas for US-Pakistan cooperation.
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Another area where Pakistan can become part of the international solution to 
the proliferation danger again involves illicit transfer.  Pakistan has agreed to join the 
Megaports and Container Security Initiatives, important efforts that draw like-minded 
states together to prevent nuclear material transfer.  Megaports has three main 
objectives: to deter terrorists from using seaports for illicit shipping, detect materials 
that may be shipped, and interdict harmful materials on board.34 The Container 
Security Initiative works in tandem with Megaports to target high-risk containers by 
pre-screening containers and using tamper-proof containers.35 With respect to CSI, 
the groundwork has been laid for Pakistan’s involvement but implementation remains 
to be done.  In the Bush-Musharraf statement, the US committed itself to supporting 
Pakistan’s participation in the Department of Energy’s Megaports Program.  Some 
groundwork also remains to be done on this effort, but it will be a major contribution 
from Pakistan in preventing illicit nuclear transfer.
On export control more generally, the key concern for the members of each of 
the major international WMD control regimes is to ensure that lists of controlled items 
are harmonized and fully implemented.  Pakistan has responsibly developed lists that 
are in conformance with international standards.  It is important that Pakistani 
guidelines are fully harmonized with the relevant international guidelines to ensure 
that all parties control the same technology in the same way.  
Membership in the relevant organizations remains to be determined.  In the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group, for example, membership cannot be granted by the US but 
rather must be agreed by consensus.  Since the Khan expose, Pakistan has taken 
steps to conform to the basic objective of the NSG, “to ensure that nuclear trade for 
peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices...”36 Yet a condition for membership in the NSG is 
that Pakistan be a member of the NPT.  Given the amendment provisions of the NPT, 
it is unlikely that Pakistan would be able to join as a NWS, even if it were so inclined, 
and joining as a non-nuclear weapon state is out of the question.  For now therefore, 
though formal participation is not an option, Pakistan can establish an excellent 
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record of control and support for the principles it endorses.  There may one day be 
room for an accommodation at the NSG for the non-NPT states, but that is not 
currently on the agenda.  This places an important limitation on NSG effectiveness, 
but it would be an ironic twist to have the two states whose activities the NSG tried to 
prevent become members, after having circumvented and defied it.  Keeping in mind 
that the NSG objective remains important and indeed shared by the outside states, 
some creative thinking is certainly warranted to find room in the NSG for all states 
now committed to preventing nuclear technology transfer.  
Bilateral actions
As previously noted and as Musharraf commented, physical security at 
storage sites is a high priority to prevent any unauthorized access, and most of what 
needs to be done will be taken care of by Pakistan.  Pakistan asserts that it currently 
ensures weapon safety and security by separating the weapon components—that is, 
the fissile core is not mated with the remaining high explosive components of the 
weapon until such time as it is necessary for possible use.37 By its own account, 
Pakistan has yet to mate its weapons or prepare them for delivery in any of its crises
or conflicts with India.  This policy complicates the task for a would-be thief, but does 
not eliminate the danger if a mated weapon were to go missing during a crisis.  In 
crisis conditions, weapon control inevitably would have to shift to field commanders, 
and heightened transportation security would be necessary.  Developing fail-safe 
mechanisms may be worth exploring, though cooperation in this area by NPT 
member states might violate their Article I commitments.  It requires that a member 
state not “in any way … assist, encourage, or induce a non-nuclear weapon State to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices”.38 From the point of 
view of ensuring global security, however, if Pakistan’s weapons were to fall into 
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terrorist hands, passive restraints should be in place to ensure against unauthorized 
use.  If a weapon went missing, Pakistan and the world would want to be sure that 
the stolen weapon would be extremely difficult, if not impossible to use.  Such safety 
features would thwart the immediate use of the weapon and allow time to investigate 
the loss and recover the weapon.
Another possible cooperative effort could be with Nuclear Emergency Support 
Team (NEST) training.  It is more likely—though still a low probability—that a 
significant quantity of fissile material would be stolen, rather than a nuclear weapon.  
Pakistan will necessarily be the first—and possibly only—responder in such an event.  
Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division takes its responsibilities seriously and has 
commissioned a unit specifically focused on the problem of safety and security.39  
This unit would benefit from advanced training to ensure effective pursuit and 
recovery of stolen material.  Security at additional sites should be addressed as well, 
and may be less sensitive targets for cooperation. 
Significant progress on the preceding measures will re-establish Pakistan’s 
credentials and overcome the ill effects of the A. Q. Khan episode.  This could open 
up opportunities for expanded energy cooperation.  On the nuclear side, some steps 
could be taken that do not violate current laws or policy.  Pakistan’s Chasma I reactor 
suffers from a loose parts problem that could be ameliorated with the provision of a 
loose parts monitoring system currently restricted under US policy and practice.40  
The problem does not create criticality dangers, but rather tends to impede optimally 
efficient functioning of the plant.  It could be addressed by closing the plant, but that 
would not help Pakistan to meet its energy needs.  The US is looking into this and 
reconsidering action. To ensure against an accident that would call global nuclear 
energy expansion into question and undercut the current US commitment to a Global 
Nuclear Energy Partnership, enhanced cooperation with Pakistan should be 
considered.  A full-blown agreement might be unnecessarily complicated, but some 
collaboration with China, for example, could be possible and constructive.  The fact 
that Pakistan’s problems are based on the Qinshan reactor design opens the 
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possibility for multilateral cooperation with China and Pakistan. Although not of US 
construction, Chasma (and its twin, Chasma-II, which is planned to begin operations 
in 2009) uses some Westinghouse technology.  A broad-based study group led by 
energy officials on design-specific safety issues could include technical managers 
from all three countries.
Pakistan’s energy planners foresee a major role for nuclear power in the 
future, but for now it makes an insignificant contribution (<1%) to Pakistan’s overall 
energy supply.  This and the problems noted earlier make non-nuclear energy 
cooperation all the more important over the near-term.41 There could be more 
substantive cooperation in the other areas of energy production in Pakistan.  In 
particular, coal reserves are substantial but remain under utilized.  Gas continues to 
be Pakistan’s major energy asset.  Hydro utilization is relatively high but can be 
politically fraught due to provincial land use disputes.  Oil also only marginally 
contributes, with about 250 million barrels of proven reserve.  Thus, coal exploitation 
and new clean coal technology may be optimal areas for expanded cooperation.  In 
addition, fixing Pakistan’s power grid will add a significant quantum of energy without 
requiring capital investment.  Repairing and modernizing the grid, improving 
standards, and then expanding the grid to all parts of the country will play an 
important role in delivering the electricity that is available to where it is needed.  
Conclusion
The Bush-Musharraf joint statement pointed the United States—Pakistan 
relationship on a new trajectory running along a number of key axes: economic 
growth, energy, peace and security, social sector development, science and 
technology, democracy, and nonproliferation.  Nonproliferation has perhaps been the 
biggest impediment in the past and holds some of the greatest challenges for the 
future.  Success on this axis will open up the enormous potential on the others.  
Failure in addressing nuclear proliferation and the new dangers it poses in the 21st
century will not just impede the wide-ranging progress both nations seek but will 
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create enormous difficulties in achieving the peaceful global order that the world 
requires.  Based on prior experience, however, both sides continue to feel what has 
been referred to as a “trust deficit”.  Lacking trust in the other, achieving such 
ambitious goals will be difficult.  Pakistan continues to feel that the US is 
opportunistic in its support of Pakistan and will again “abandon” Pakistan, especially 
given the apparent vigor in the new US-India relationship.  De-hyphenating, from 
Pakistan’s perspective, may be the equivalent of Pakistan being cut adrift so long as 
India anchors US involvement in South Asia.  The US tends to misread Pakistan’s 
strategic imperatives, interpreting steps Pakistan takes to enhance its regional 
security in the West (especially regarding Afghanistan) and ensure deterrence 
against India in the East as inconsistent with its stated commitments to the peaceful 
resolution of conflict in South Asia.  Converting nuclear proliferation, one of the major 
contributors to this “trust deficit”, from a point of disagreement to one of cooperation 
will challenge the negotiating skills and strategic vision of both sides.  The issue can 
draw them to the same side of the table or continue to stand between them as they 
pursue separate agendas.  Certain of the issues proposed in this paper may provide 
small steps toward solving some of the larger issues that continue to undercut trust 
and increase insecurity in the region.
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